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Abstract
We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have
when the indifference relation(s) need not be transitive. Two results are obtained about the
existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence when both strategies and
parameters form chains. Two more results are obtained about the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in games with strategic complementarities where strategy sets are chains, but monotone selections
from the best response correspondences need not exist.
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1 Introduction
The standard way to describe preferences of the players in game theory – with utility functions –
looks severely restrictive when compared with what is available in choice theory (Fishburn, 1973;
Sen, 1984; Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995). The desirability of bridging the gap has been recognized
since, at the latest, Aumann (1962, 1964). However, familiar approaches quite often do not work in
a broader context, or have to be modified substantially.
This paper strives to find out what equilibrium existence results could be derived from strategic
complementarity or substitutability when the preferences are defined by binary relations such that
incomparability need not be transitive. The study of games with strategic complementarities was
started in a cardinal framework, “supermodular games” (Topkis, 1979; Veinott, 1989; Vives, 1990;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Milgrom and Shannon (1994) developed a purely ordinal version, but
their approach only works when the preferences of each player are described with an ordering (i.e.,
indifference is transitive). The same is valid with respect to later papers (Athey, 2001; Quah, 2007;
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Quah and Strulovici, 2009; Reny, 2011). If a broader class of preference relations is allowed, the
whole edifice collapses.
Suppose the utility function is bounded above, but need not attain a maximum; then ε-optimiza-
tion suggests itself strongly, which means allowing intransitive indifference. The (ε-)best response
correspondence need not be ascending even if the utility function is supermodular and the increasing
differences condition holds; it is only weakly ascending under these strong assumptions. The set of
(ε-)best responses to a particular profile of strategies of other players need not be a lattice and need
not be complete, hence the existence of a monotone selection cannot be derived even from Veinott
(1989, Theorem 3.2), so there is nothing to apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem to. To the best of
my knowledge, the previous literature contains no existence result for ε-Nash equilibria in games
with strategic complementarity (to say nothing of strategic substitutability) where the existence of
the best responses is not guaranteed. “Multi-criterial optimization” may be mentioned as another
source of similar (in some aspects, even worse) problems.
The main point of this paper is that something can be obtained even in such situations. One
“only” has to apply roundabout techniques and reconcile oneself to less impressive results. We
do not specifically address ε-optimization or Pareto dominance. Instead, we start with preferences
described by an arbitrary binary relation and then consequently impose restrictions under which
tangible results are possible.
Theorems 1 and 2 establish the existence of a monotone selection from the best response cor-
respondence when both available choices and parameters form chains. Proposition 5 about the
existence of an ε-Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complements or substitutes and an ap-
propriate aggregation easily follows. It should be noted that every equilibrium existence result in
the literature on games with decreasing best responses hinges on the presence of scalar aggregation
in the utilities and the availability of monotone selections (Novshek, 1985; Kukushkin, 1994, 2003,
2004, 2005; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010), hence the restriction to chains is natural.
No aggregation in the utilities is needed for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the standard
theory of games with strategic complementarities. Theorems 3 and 4 show the fact to hold in a
more general setting; only transitivity of strict preference is required. In particular, both theorems
may work in the absence of monotone selections. Unfortunately, we still have to assume that every
strategy set is a chain although there is no counterexample with multi-dimensional strategies.
Section 2 introduces conditions on preferences that ensure the existence of optimal choices and
some weak analogs of the “revealed preference” property. Section 3 contains two theorems on the
existence of monotone selections; Section 4, two theorems on the existence of a Nash equilibrium in
the absence of monotone selections. More complicated proofs are deferred to Section 5; concluding
remarks are collected in Section 6.
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2 Preferences and choice
A strict order is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation. A set with a given strict order is called
a partially ordered set (poset); when the order is total, i.e., every two different points are comparable,
the poset is called a chain.
Let the preferences of an agent over alternatives from a set X be described by a binary relation
Â. For every Y ⊆ X, we denote
M(Y,Â) := {x ∈ Y | @ y ∈ Y [y Â x]}, (1)
the set of “optimal,” or rather acceptable, choices from Y .
An ordering is a negatively transitive strict order: z 6Â y 6Â x⇒ z 6Â x. Actually, Â is an ordering
if and only if there are a chain L and a mapping u : X → L such that, for all x, y ∈ X,
y Â x ⇐⇒ u(y) > u(x).
There is no big difference between preferences described by orderings and (ordinal) utility functions.
What is needed to obtain the usual connections (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; LiCalzi and Veinott,
1992; Shannon, 1995) between properties such as single crossing or quasisupermodularity, on one
hand, and the monotonicity of optima on the other, is this, “revealed preference,” property:
∀x, y ∈ X [x /∈M(X,Â) 3 y ⇒ y Â x]. (2)
As is well known, (2) always holds for an ordering Â. Moreover, if it holds on every finite subset of
X, then Â must be an ordering.
Here we rely on properties weaker than (2). A binary relation Â has the NM-property on a subset
Y ⊆ X if
∀x ∈ Y \M(Y,Â)∃y ∈M(Y,Â) [y Â x]. (3)
Â has the strong NM-property on a subset Y ⊆ X if
∀{x0, . . . , xm} ⊆ Y \M(Y,Â)∃y ∈M(Y,Â)∀k ∈ {0, . . . ,m} [y Â xk]. (4)
It turns out that, roughly speaking, the strong NM-property (plus single crossing) is conducive to
the existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence, while the NM-property
is conducive to the existence of a Nash equilibrium under strategic complementarity.
A strict order Â is called an interval order if it satisfies the condition
∀x, y, a, b ∈ X [ [y Â x & a Â b]⇒ [y Â b or a Â x] ]. (5)
Actually, Â is an interval order if and only if there are a chain L and two mappings u+, u− : X → L
such that, for all x, y ∈ X,
u+(x) ≥ u−(x); y Â x ⇐⇒ u−(y) > u+(x).
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A relation Â is strictly acyclic if there exists no infinite improvement path, i.e., no sequence
〈xk〉k∈N such that xk+1 Â xk for all k. As an example, let u : X → R be bounded above and ε > 0;
let the preference relation be
y Â x­ u(y) > u(x) + ε. (6)
It is easily seen that Â is a strictly acyclic interval order (even a semiorder). M(Y,Â) consists of all
ε-maxima of u on Y .
Routine proofs of the two following statements are given for completeness.
Proposition 1. Let Â be a binary relation on a set X. Then Â has the NM-property on every
nonempty subset Y ⊆ X if and only if it is strictly acyclic and transitive.
Proof. To prove the sufficiency, we assume x∗ ∈ Y \M(Y,Â). There is y1 ∈ Y such that y1 Â x∗.
If y1 ∈ M(Y,Â), we are home; otherwise, there is y2 ∈ Y such that y2 Â y1 Â x∗. Iterating this
argument, we obtain an improvement path x∗, y1, y2, . . . Since Â is strictly acyclic, the path ends,
at some stage, with ym ∈M(Y,Â). Since Â is transitive, we have ym Â x∗.
Conversely, if Â admits an infinite improvement path 〈xk〉k∈N, then M({xk}k∈N,Â) = ∅. If
z Â y Â x, but z 6Â x, then M({x, y, z},Â) = {z}, hence (3) does not hold for Y = {x, y, z} and
x∗ = x.
Remark. Strict acyclicity alone is necessary and sufficient for the property that M(Y,Â) 6= ∅
whenever X ⊇ Y 6= ∅.
Proposition 2. Let Â be a binary relation on a set X. Then Â has the strong NM-property on
every nonempty subset Y ⊆ X if and only if it is a strictly acyclic interval order.
Proof. To prove the sufficiency, we assume {x0, . . . , xm} ⊆ Y \ M(Y,Â). When m = 0, we just
invoke Proposition 1. Then we argue by induction. For m > 0, the induction hypothesis implies the
existence of y′ ∈ M(Y,Â) such that y′ Â xk for each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1; we also have y′′ ∈ M(Y,Â)
such that y′′ Â xm. For each k = 0, . . . ,m − 1, we apply (5) to xk, y′, y′′, xm, obtaining that either
y′ Â xm or y′′ Â xk for each k = 0, . . . ,m− 1. In either case, we are home.
Conversely, if (5) does not hold, we have M({x, y, a, b},Â) = {y, a}, hence (4) does not hold for
Y = {x, y, a, b} and {x, b} ⊆ Y \M(Y,Â).
Various versions of compactness-continuity may be substituted for strict acyclicity. We consider
just one of them, expressed in terms of order rather than topology. A chain X is complete if the
least upper bound supY and the greatest lower bound inf Y exist in X for every subset Y ⊆ X.
A subset Y of a complete chain X is subcomplete if supZ ∈ Y and inf Z ∈ Y for every nonempty
subset Z ⊆ Y . We denote CX the set of nonempty subcomplete subsets of X.
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Assuming X a complete chain and given Y ⊆ X, we denote Y ← := Y \ {inf Y } and Y → :=
Y \ {supY }. Then we define a very weak version of upper semicontinuity:
∀Y ∈ CX
[(
supY → = supY & ∀x, y ∈ Y → [y > x⇒ y Â x])⇒ ∀x ∈ Y → [supY Â x] ]; (7a)
∀Y ∈ CX
[(
inf Y ← = inf Y & ∀x, y ∈ Y ← [x > y ⇒ y Â x])⇒ ∀x ∈ Y ← [inf Y Â x] ]. (7b)
Remark. Every strictly acyclic relation satisfies (7) vacuously: both pairs of “left hand side” con-
ditions are incompatible in this case.
Proposition 3. Let Â be a binary relation on a complete chain X. Then Â has the NM-property
on every Y ∈ CX if and only if it is a strict order satisfying both conditions (7).
The proof is deferred to Section 5.1.
Remark. There is an obvious, if vague, analogy to Theorem 1 of Kukushkin (2008); conditions (7)
are similar to “ω-transitivity” there.
Proposition 4. Let Â be a binary relation on a complete chain X. Then Â has the strong NM-prop-
erty on every Y ∈ CX if and only if it is an interval order satisfying both conditions (7).
The sufficiency is proven with a reference to Proposition 3 combined with the same argument as
in the proof of Proposition 2. The necessity for Â to be an interval order is proven in the same way
as in Proposition 2; the necessity of conditions (7) immediately follows from Proposition 3.
3 Monotone selections
We consider a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of binary relations on X; the parameter s reflects outside
influences (e.g., the choices of other agents). To simplify notations, we define the best response
correspondence:
R(s) :=M(X,Âs). (8)
Henceforth, we always assume X and S to be posets (most often, just chains). A mapping
r : S → X is increasing if r(s′′) ≥ r(s′) whenever s′, s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ≥ s′. A monotone selection from
R is an increasing mapping r : S → X such that r(s) ∈ R(s) for every s ∈ S.
A parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S has the single crossing property if these conditions hold:
∀x, y ∈ X ∀s, s′ ∈ S [[s′ > s & y Âs x & y > x]⇒ y Âs′ x]; (9a)
∀x, y ∈ X ∀s, s′ ∈ S [[s′ > s & y Âs′ x & y < x]⇒ y Âs x]. (9b)
This definition is equivalent to Milgrom and Shannon’s (1994) if every Âs is an ordering represented
by a numeric function.
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For a family of preference relations defined by ε-optimization (6) with a parameter s in the
function, both conditions (9) hold if u(x, s) satisfies Topkis’s (1979) increasing differences condition:
∀x, y ∈ X ∀s, s′ ∈ S [[s′ ≥ s & y ≥ x]⇒ u(y, s′)− u(x, s′) ≥ u(y, s)− u(x, s)]. (10)
When X and S are chains, the condition is equivalent to the supermodularity of u (as a function on
the lattice X × S).
Theorem 1. Let X and S be chains. Let a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of strictly acyclic relations on
X satisfy single crossing conditions (9). Let every Âs (s ∈ S) have the strong NM-property on X.
Then there exists a monotone selection from R on S.
The proof is deferred to Subsection 5.2.
Corollary. Let X and S be chains. Let a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of strictly acyclic interval orders
on X satisfy single crossing conditions (9). Then there exists a monotone selection from R on S.
An application of Theorem 2 from Kukushkin (2005) to monotone selections from ε-best response
correspondences existing by our Theorem 1 immediately gives us, e.g., this result.
Proposition 5. Let Γ be a strategic game with a compact strategy set Xi ⊂ R for each i ∈ N .
Let each utility function be ui(xN ) = Ui(xi,
∑
j 6=i aijxj), where aij = aji ∈ R whenever j 6= i. Let
each Ui(·, s) be bounded above and let the increasing differences condition (10) be satisfied by each
Ui(xi, s). Then Γ possesses an ε-Nash equilibrium for every ε > 0.
Remark. When aij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i, we have a game with strategic complementarity; when aij ≤ 0
for all j 6= i, a game with strategic substitutability. A more general situation with coefficients of
both signs is also possible. The linear aggregate of the choices of other players can be replaced with a
polylinear combination, or the (minus) minimum/maximum of them (Kukushkin, 2003, Theorems 7
and 8).
If the strong NM-property assumption is just dropped, Theorem 1 becomes wrong even for finite
sets X and S, see Example 3 below. Under the assumption that every Âs has the NM-property on
X, Theorem 1 fails in full generality (Example 1 below), but is valid for finite X or S.
Proposition 6. Let X and S be chains. Let a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of binary relations on X
satisfy (9a). Let every Âs (s ∈ S) have the NM-property on X. If either X or S is finite, then there
exists a monotone selection from R on S.
Proof. Let S be finite. We start with s+ := maxS and pick r(s+) ∈ R(s+) arbitrarily. Then we
move along S downwards, denoting s + 1 the point in S immediately above s. If r(s + 1) ∈ R(s),
we set r(s) := r(s + 1); otherwise, we invoke (3) and pick r(s) ∈ R(s) such that r(s) Âs r(s + 1).
The inequality r(s) > r(s+ 1) would, by (9a), imply r(s) Âs+1 r(s+ 1), contradicting the induction
hypothesis; therefore, r(s) ≤ r(s+ 1) for all s ∈ S.
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Now let X be finite. For every s ∈ S, we set r(s) := minR(s). The inequalities s′ > s and
r(s) > r(s′) would imply r(s′) /∈ R(s), hence R(s) 3 y Âs r(s′) by (3). By the definition of r(s), we
have y ≥ r(s) > r(s′), hence y Âs′ r(s′) by (9a), contradicting the definition of r(s′).
Remark. By duality, (9a) can be replaced with (9b).
Example 1. Let X := [−2, 2], S := [−1, 1] (both with natural orders), and relations Âs be defined
by
y Âs x­ [u1(y, s) > u1(x, s) & u2(y, s) > u2(x, s)], (11)
where u : X × S → R2 is this: u(1, s) := 〈5, 2〉 and u(−1, s) := 〈2, 5〉 for all s ∈ S; u(2, s) :=
u(−2, s) := u(x, s) := 〈0, 0〉 for all x ∈ ]− 1, 1[ and s ∈ S; whenever x ∈ ]1, 2[ and s ≥ 0,
u1(x, s) :=
{
x+ s− 1, if x+ s ≤ 2,
x+ s+ 4, if x+ s > 2,
while u2(x, s) := 6 − x − s; whenever x ∈ ]− 2,−1[ and s ≥ 0, u(x, s) := 〈x + 6,−1 − x〉; finally,
ui(x, s) for all s < 0, i = 1, 2, and x ∈ ]− 2,−1[ ∪ ]1, 2[ is such that the equality
ui(x, s) = u3−i(−x,−s) (12)
holds for all s ∈ S, i = 1, 2, and x ∈ X.
The very form of (11) ensures that every Âs is irreflexive and transitive. Whenever x ∈ {−2} ∪
]−1, 1[ ∪ {2} and y ∈ ]− 2,−1] ∪ [1, 2[, y Âs x for every s ∈ S. Whenever x, y ∈ ]− 2,−1[ or
x, y ∈ ]1, 2[, y Âs x does not hold for any s ∈ S. Let s ≥ 0; if −2 < x < −1, then u1(x) < 5 and
u2(x) ≤ 1, hence 1 Âs x; if 1 < x ≤ 2 − s < 2, then u1(x) ≤ 1 and u2(x) < 5, hence −1 Âs x; if
2− s < y < 2, then u1(y) > 6 and u2(y) > 3, hence y Âs 1. “Dually,” by (12), y Âs −1 Âs x whenever
s < 0, −2 < y < −2− s, and 1 < x < 2; 1 Âs x whenever s < 0 and −2− s ≤ x < −1. Thus, we see
that every relation Âs is strictly acyclic: no more than three consecutive improvements can be made
from any starting point (e.g., 2− s/2 Âs 1 Âs −1.5 Âs −2 when s > 0). Single crossing conditions (9)
are also easy to check.
Suppose there is a monotone selection r fromR. If r(s) > −1 for some s > 0, then 2 > r(s) > 2−s;
defining s′ := 2−r(s) > 0, we have s′ < s, hence r(s′) ≤ r(s), hence r(s′) < 2−s′, hence r(s′) ∈ R(s′)
is only possible if r(s′) = −1. Therefore, r(s) = −1 for some s > 0; dually, r(s) = 1 for some s < 0.
We have a contradiction, i.e., there is no monotone selection: Theorem 1 cannot be extended to
strictly acyclic and transitive preference relations.
Remark. It is easy to see that the orderings defined by functions u1 and u2 in Example 1 are not
strictly acyclic. Moreover, if, given arbitrary chains X and S, we considered a preference relation
y Âs x­ [u1(y, s) > u1(x, s) + ε & u2(y, s) > u2(x, s) + ε]
with ε > 0 and both ui bounded above in x for every s ∈ S, then R(s) would contain the set of
ε-optima of u1(x, s)+u2(x, s), which admits a monotone selection by Theorem 1. Thus, the example
cannot claim to present typical problems with parametric multi-criterial ε-optimization.
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Theorem 2. Let X and S be chains, and X be complete. Let a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of transitive
binary relations on X satisfy single crossing conditions (9). Let every Âs satisfy both conditions (7)
and have the strong NM-property on X. Then there exists a monotone selection from R on S.
The proof is deferred to Subsection 5.3.
4 Nash equilibrium without monotone selections
Let us consider a modification of the standard notion of a strategic game. There is a finite set N of
players and a poset Xi of strategies for each i ∈ N . We denote XN :=
∏
i∈N Xi and X−i :=
∏
j 6=iXj ;
both are posets with the Cartesian product of the orders on components. Each player i’s preferences
are described by a parametric family of binary relations Âx−ii (x−i ∈ X−i) on Xi; the player’s best
response correspondence Ri is defined by (8) with S := X−i. A Nash equilibrium is xN ∈ XN such
that xi ∈ Ri(x−i) for each i ∈ N .
When each player’s preferences are defined with a utility function ui(xN ), our definition of a
Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the standard one. It may be worthwhile to note that the question
of, say, (in)efficiency of equilibria makes no sense in our framework. Assuming that the preferences
are defined in the style of (6), our definition transforms into that of an ε-Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a strategic game where each Xi is a chain such that both minXi and maxXi
exist. Let the parametric family of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions (9). Let
every relation Âx−ii be strictly acyclic and have the NM-property on Xi. Then Γ possesses a Nash
equilibrium.
The proof is deferred to Subsection 5.4.
Example 2. Let N := {1, 2}, X1 := X2 := ]0, 1] (with the natural order); let preferences of the
players be defined by (6) with utility functions u1(x1, x2) := − |2x1 − x2| /x2 and u2(x1, x2) :=
− |x1 − x2| /x1, and ε ∈ ]0, (3−
√
5)/2[. All assumptions of Theorem 3 (or Theorem 4 for that
matter) are satisfied except for the existence of minXi; single crossing conditions (9) hold because
both utility functions are supermodular. There is no (ε-)Nash equilibrium: x2 > (1− ε)x1 whenever
x2 ∈ R2(x1), while x1 > (2 − ε)x2 whenever x1 ∈ R1(x2); therefore, there should hold x2 >
(1− ε)(2− ε)x2 > x2 at any equilibrium.
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a strategic game where each Xi is a complete chain. Let the parametric family
of preference relations of each player satisfy both conditions (9). Let every relation Âx−ii be a strict
order satisfying both conditions (7). Then Γ possesses a Nash equilibrium.
The proof is deferred to Subsection 5.5.
Example 1 shows that the assumptions of Theorems 3 or 4 do not ensure the existence of mono-
tone selections from the best response correspondences. Both theorems become just wrong without
NM-property, even for finite sets Xi.
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Example 3. Let N := {1, 2}, X1 := {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and X2 := {5, 6} (both with natural orders); let
preference relations Âx−ii be defined by: 2 Â51 4 Â51 0 Â51 1 Â51 3; 1 Â61 3 Â61 2 Â61 4 Â61 0; 5 Âx12 6
whenever x1 ≤ 1; 6 Âx12 5 whenever x1 ≥ 2. The preferences of player 1 are intransitive, but single
crossing conditions (9) are easy to check: (9a) is nontrivial only for 4 Â51 0; (9b), only for 1 Â61 3 and
2 Â61 4. Player 2’s preferences are described by a family of total orders; (9) are obvious. There is no
Nash equilibrium: R1(5) = {2} and R1(6) = {1}, whereas R2(2) = {6} and R2(1) = {5}. It may be
noted that R1 admits no monotone selection.
5 Proofs
The proofs of theorems where conditions (7) are involved are based on transfinite recursion; it seems
worthwhile to start with an outline of the method.
A poset is well ordered if every subset contains a least point (hence the poset is a chain). When
dealing with a well ordered poset ∆, we always denote 0 := min∆ and [0, α] := {β ∈ ∆ | β ≤ α}. The
successor of α ∈ ∆, denoted α + 1, is uniquely defined as min{β ∈ ∆ | β > α} (unless α = max∆,
but it does not matter).
The principle of transfinite recursion allows us to consider a mapping λ : ∆ → X well defined if
we have defined λ(0) ∈ X and described how λ(α) ∈ X should be constructed given λ(β) ∈ X for all
β < α. Quite often, the definition of λ(α+ 1) is based on λ(α) alone, so all β < α are only involved
when α is a limit, i.e., not the successor to any β ∈ ∆.
The application of this technique to the proof of a theorem starts with an appropriate poset X
such that the statement of the theorem is equivalent to the existence of a point in X satisfying a
certain condition. In the case of Proposition 3, X is the set of feasible choices; in Theorem 4, it
is the set of strategy profiles; in Theorem 2, it is, roughly speaking, the set of “partial monotone
selections.” The Zermelo Theorem – Every set can be well ordered – implies the existence of an
infinite well ordered set ∆ with a cardinality greater than that of X . Then we construct an increasing
mapping λ : ∆ → X with the property that an equality λ(α′) = λ(α) with α′ > α is only possible
when λ(α) is a point we need. Since the cardinality of ∆ is greater than that of X , the equality
must occur at some stage. The definition of λ(α+ 1) given λ(α) is specific in each case, while λ(α)
for a limit α is always λ(α) := sup{λ(β)}β<α. The latter fact ensures that λ([0, α]) ∈ CX and
λ(α) = supλ([0, α]) = sup
(
λ([0, α]) \ {λ(α)}), hence condition (7a) can be applied.
The dual version of the scheme, where λ : ∆ → X is decreasing and λ(α) := inf{λ(β)}β<α for
every limit α, so (7b) can be applied, is valid too, but remains behind the scene.
5.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The necessity part is rather straightforward. First, Â must be a strict order for the same reason
as in Proposition 1. Let the “left hand side” condition in (7a) be satisfied for Y ⊆ X. Since
supY → = supY , for every y ∈ Y → there is y′ ∈ Y → such that y′ > y, hence y′ Â y. Therefore,
9
M(Y,Â)∩ Y → = ∅, hence (3) implies that M(Y,Â) = {supY } and supY Â y for every y ∈ Y →, i.e.,
(7a) holds. The necessity of (7b) is proven dually.
We start the sufficiency proof with the definition of two auxiliary strict orders:
y Â> x­ [y Â x & y > x];
y Â< x­ [y Â x & y < x].
Lemma 5.1.1. Let X be a complete chain and Â be a strict order on X satisfying (7a). Then Â>
has the NM-property on X.
Proof. Let x0 ∈ X \M(X, Â> ) and let ∆ be a well ordered set of a cardinality greater than that
of X. We define a mapping λ : ∆ → X by transfinite recursion. First, λ(0) := x0. Whenever
λ(α) /∈ M(X, Â> ), we pick λ(α + 1) ∈ X such that λ(α + 1) Â> λ(α). If λ(α) ∈ M(X, Â> ), we set
λ(α + 1) := λ(α). Whenever α is a limit, we set λ(α) := sup{λ(β)}β<α. Since λ(α + 1) > λ(α)
whenever λ(α) /∈ M(X, Â> ), there must be α¯ ∈ ∆ such that λ(α¯) ∈ M(X, Â> ), hence λ(α) = λ(α¯) ∈
M(X, Â> ) for all α ≥ α¯. Without restricting generality, we assume that α¯ is minimal with the
property.
Straightforward transfinite induction in α ∈ ∆ shows that
∀β ∈ ∆ [[α > β & α¯ > β]⇒ λ(α) Â> λ(β)] (13)
for all α ∈ ∆: λ(1) Â> λ(0) by the definition of λ; if (13) holds for α, then λ(α + 1) Â> λ(α) by the
definition of λ and λ(α+1) Â> λ(β) for all β < α by transitivity; if α is a limit and (13) holds for all
α′ < α, then (13) for α follows from (7a) because the monotonicity condition holds by the induction
hypothesis.
Thus, M(X, Â> ) 3 λ(α¯) Â> λ(0) = x0 and we are home.
Lemma 5.1.2. Let X be a complete chain and Â be a strict order on X satisfying (7b). Then Â<
has the NM-property on X.
The proof is dual to that of Lemma 5.1.1.
The final argument is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1.1. Let Y ∈ CX and x0 ∈ Y \M(Y,Â).
Without restricting generality, x0 /∈ M(Y, Â< ); by Lemma 5.1.2, there is x∗ ∈ M(Y, Â< ) such that
x∗ Â x0. By transfinite recursion, we define a mapping λ : ∆ → Y , where ∆ is a well ordered set
of a cardinality greater than that of Y , such that λ(α) ∈ M(Y, Â< ) for all α ∈ ∆ and λ(α) Â> λ(β)
whenever α > β unless λ(β) ∈M(Y,Â), in which case λ(α) = λ(β). First, we set λ(0) := x∗.
Whenever λ(α) ∈ M(Y, Â> ), we have λ(α) ∈ M(Y,Â) as well; we set λ(α + 1) := λ(α) in this
case, hence λ(α′) = λ(α) for all α′ > α. If λ(α) /∈M(Y, Â> ), we pick y∗ ∈ Y such that y∗ Â> λ(α). If
y∗ ∈M(Y, Â< ), we set λ(α+1) := y∗; otherwise, we apply Lemma 5.1.2, obtaining λ(α+1) ∈M(Y, Â< )
such that λ(α + 1) Â< y∗. Since λ(α + 1) Â λ(α) and λ(α) ∈ M(Y, Â< ), we have λ(α + 1) > λ(α),
hence λ(α+1) Â> λ(α) in this case, hence λ(α+1) Â> λ(β) for all β < α by the induction hypothesis.
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Whenever α is a limit, we set λ(α) := sup{λ(β)}β<α; λ(α) ∈ Y because Y ∈ CX . If there is
β < α such that λ(β) ∈ M(Y,Â), then λ(α) = λ(β). Otherwise, the monotonicity condition in the
left hand side of (7a) holds by the induction hypothesis; therefore, λ(α) Â> λ(β) for every β < α by
(7a). Besides, λ(α) ∈M(Y, Â< ): the existence of y ∈ Y such that y Â< λ(α) would immediately imply
y < λ(β) for some β < α, hence y Â< λ(β), contradicting the induction hypothesis λ(β) ∈M(Y, Â< ).
Since λ(α+ 1) > λ(α) whenever λ(α) /∈M(Y,Â), while the cardinality of ∆ is greater than that
of Y , there must be α¯ ∈ ∆ such that λ(α¯) ∈M(X,Â), hence λ(α) = λ(α¯) ∈M(X,Â) for all α ≥ α¯.
Then we have λ(α¯) Â λ(0) Â x0.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1
A subset S′ ⊆ S is an interval if s ∈ S′ whenever s′ < s < s′′ and s′, s′′ ∈ S′. The intersection of any
number of intervals is an interval too. Let S be a chain, S′ ⊆ S be an interval, and s ∈ S \ S′; then
either s > s′ for all s′ ∈ S′, or s′ > s for all s′ ∈ S′. We write s > S′ in the first case, and s < S′ in
the second.
Lemma 5.2.1. Let a parametric family 〈Âs〉s∈S of binary relations on a chain X satisfy both con-
ditions (9). Let every Âs have the NM-property on X. Then the set {s ∈ S | x ∈ R(s)}, for every
x ∈ X, is an interval.
Proof. Suppose the contrary: s′ < s < s′′ and x ∈ R(s′) ∩ R(s′′), but x /∈ R(s). By (3), we can
pick x∗ ∈ R(s) such that x∗ Âs x. If x∗ > x, we have x∗ Âs′′ x by (9a), contradicting the assumed
x ∈ R(s′′). If x∗ < x, we have x∗ Âs′ x by (9b) with the same contradiction.
The key role is played by the following recursive definition of sequences xk ∈ X, sk ∈ S, Sk ⊆ S,
and ϑk ∈ {−1, 1} (k ∈ N) such that, in particular,
sk ∈ Sk; (14a)
Sk is an interval; (14b)
∀s ∈ Sk [xk ∈ R(s)]; (14c)
∀m < k [Sk ∩ Sm = ∅]; (14d)
∀s ∈ S [[xk ∈ R(s) & s < Sk]⇒ ∃m < k [s ∈ Sm or s < sm < sk]]; (14e)
∀s ∈ S [[xk ∈ R(s) & s > Sk]⇒ ∃m < k [s ∈ Sm or s > sm > sk]]; (14f)
∀m < k [[sk < sm ⇒ xk < xm] & [sk > sm ⇒ xk > xm]]; (14g)
∀m < k [xk Âsk xm or xm ∈ R(sk)]. (14h)
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We start with an arbitrary s0 ∈ S, pick x0 ∈ R(s0), and set S0 := {s ∈ S | x0 ∈ R(s)} and
ϑ0 := 1. Now (14a), (14c), (14e) and (14f) for k = 0 immediately follow from the definitions; (14b),
from Lemma 5.2.1; (14d), (14g), and (14h) hold vacuously.
Let k ∈ N \ {0}, and let xm, sm, Sm satisfying (14) have been defined for all m < k. We define
Σk :=
⋃
m<k S
m. For every s ∈ Σk, there is a unique, by (14d), µ(s) < k such that s ∈ Sµ(s). By
(14c), r(s) := xµ(s) is a selection from R on Σk. The conditions (14b) and (14g) imply that r is
increasing. If Σk = S, then we already have a monotone selection, so we stop the process.
Otherwise, we proceed in accordance with the following rules. First, we look for s ∈ S \ Σk
such that both K−k (s) := {m < k | sm < s} and K+k (s) := {m < k | sm > s} are not empty; if
successful, we pick one of them as sk and set ϑk := ϑk−1. Otherwise, i.e., if Σk is an interval, we set
ϑk := −ϑk−1. Then, if ϑk−1 = −1, we first look for sk ∈ S \ Σk such that K−k (sk) = ∅; if ϑk−1 = 1,
we first look for sk ∈ S \ Σk such that K+k (sk) = ∅. If the search is unsuccessful in either case, we
pick sk ∈ S \ Σk arbitrarily.
We denote K∗ := {m < k | xm /∈ R(sk)}, m− := argmaxm∈K−k (sk) s
m, m+ := argminm∈K+k (sk) s
m,
and I := [sm
−
, sm
+
]. If one of K±k (s
k) is empty, the respective m± is left undefined, in which case
I := {s ∈ S | sm− < s} or I := {s ∈ S | s < sm+}. By (4), we can pick xk ∈ R(sk) such that
xk Âsk xm for each m ∈ K∗, hence (14h) holds. Finally, we define Sk := {s ∈ S \Σk | xk ∈ R(s)}∩ I.
Now the conditions (14a), (14c), and (14d) immediately follow from the definitions; (14b), (14e) and
(14f), from Lemma 5.2.1.
Checking (14g) needs a bit more effort. If we assume that xm
− ∈ R(sk), then the condition
(14e) for m− and sk implies the existence of m < m− such that sm− < sm < sk, contradicting the
definition of m−; therefore, m− ∈ K∗, hence xk Âsk xm− by the choice of xk. If xk < xm− then
xk Âsm− xm− by (9b), contradicting (14c) for m−. Therefore, xk > xm− ≥ xm for all m ∈ K−k (sk).
A dual argument shows that xk < xm
+ ≤ xm for all m ∈ K+k (sk). Thus, (14g) holds.
To summarize, either we obtain a monotone selection on some step, or our sequences are defined
[and satisfy (14)] for all k ∈ N.
Lemma 5.2.2. Let there be a sequence 〈kn〉n∈N such that kn+1 > kn and skn+1 > skn for all n ∈ N;
then there is no s ∈ S such that s ≥ skn for all n ∈ N.
Proof. We denote H := {h ∈ N | ∃n ∈ N [sh < skn ]} ⊇ {kn}n∈N and recursively define a sequence
〈κn〉n∈N in this way: κ0 := k0; given κn, κn+1 := min{h ∈ H | sh > sκn} [6= ∅]. Obviously, the
sequence 〈κn〉n∈N satisfies the same monotonicity conditions as 〈kn〉n∈N.
For every n ∈ N, we have xκn+1 > xκh by (14g) and xκn+1 Âsκh+1 xκn by (14e) and the minimality
of κn+1. If an upper bound s for skn existed, it would be an upper bound for sκn as well because of
the definition of H. Therefore, we would have xκn+1 Âs xκn by (9a) for all n ∈ N, contradicting the
strict acyclicity of Âs.
Lemma 5.2.3. Let there be a sequence 〈kn〉n∈N such that kn+1 > kn and skn+1 < skn for all n ∈ N;
then there is no s ∈ S such that s ≤ skn for all n ∈ N.
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The proof is dual to that of Lemma 5.2.2.
Let us assume our sequences defined for all k ∈ N, and define Σ∞ := ⋃k∈N Sk. The same
r(s) := xµ(s) is a monotone selection from R on Σ∞. The final step of the proof consists in showing
that Σ∞ = S.
Let us suppose that Σ∞ is not an interval. Then there must be s ∈ S \ Σ∞ such that both
K−k (s) and K
+
k (s), as defined in the recursive process, are nonempty for some k ∈ N. We denote
s− := min{sm | m ≤ k} < s and s+ := max{sm | m ≤ k} > s. For every h > k, Σh is not an
interval, hence we have s− < sh < s+ for all h > k, hence s− ≤ sh ≤ s+ for all h ∈ N. Now we
have a contradiction with Lemma 5.2.2 or Lemma 5.2.3: one can always find a strictly increasing or
strictly decreasing subsequence in an infinite sequence without repetitions.
Let there be s ∈ S \ Σ∞ such that s > sk for all k ∈ N. Then Lemma 5.2.2 immediately implies
the existence of max{sk}k∈N < s; let sn ≥ sk for all k ∈ N. We define s− := min{sk | k ≤ n} < s;
if s− ≤ sk ≤ sn for all k ∈ N, we have the same contradiction as in the preceding paragraph.
Otherwise, we define h := min{k ∈ N | sk < s−}; by definition, we have sh < sk ≤ sn for all k < h,
hence K−h−1(s
h) = ∅. Now the description of the recursive process implies that Σh is an interval and
ϑh−1 = −1 [because K+h−1(s) = ∅ ]. Therefore, ϑh = 1, hence the inequality sk < sn for k > h is only
possible if Σk is not an interval, hence we have sh < sk < sn for all k > h, hence sh ≤ sk ≤ sn for all
k with the same contradiction again.
The case of s ∈ S \ Σ∞ such that s < sk for all k is treated dually. Thus, Σ∞ = S and the
theorem is proven.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We argue rather similarly to the proof of Theorem 1. The main difference is that the recursive
process now is, generally, transfinite. This fact entails several complications; first of all, we cannot
maintain (14h) any longer.
Let ∆ be a well ordered set of a cardinality greater than that of S. By transfinite recursion, we
construct a chain of subsets Σ(α) ⊆ S (α ∈ ∆) such that Σ(β) ⊆ Σ(α) whenever β < α, with an
equality only possible when Σ(β) = S; we also construct increasing mappings (“partial monotone
selections”) rα : Σ(α + 1) → X such that rα(s) ∈ R(s) for every s ∈ Σ(α + 1) and rα|Σ(β+1) = rβ
whenever β < α. Since the cardinality of ∆ is greater than that of S, there must be α¯ ∈ ∆ such that
Σ(α¯) = Σ(α¯+ 1) = S hence rα¯ : S → X is a monotone selection from R.
We start with Σ(0) := ∅. The recursive definition of Σ(α) ⊆ S for α > 0 uses a number of auxiliary
constructions recursively defined whenever Σ(α) ⊂ S, namely σ(α) ∈ S, S(α) ⊆ S, ξ(α) ∈ X, and
ϑ(α) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that:
σ(α) ∈ S(α); (15a)
S(α) is an interval; (15b)
∀s ∈ S(α) [ξ(α) ∈ R(s)]; (15c)
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∀β < α [S(α) ∩ S(β) = ∅]; (15d)
∀s ∈ S [[ξ(α) ∈ R(s) & s < S(α)]⇒ ∃β < α [s ∈ S(β) or s < σ(β) < σ(α)]]; (15e)
∀s ∈ S [[ξ(α) ∈ R(s) & s > S(α)]⇒ ∃β < α [s ∈ S(β) or s > σ(β) > σ(α)]]; (15f)
∀β < α [[σ(α) < σ(β)⇒ ξ(α) < ξ(β)] & [σ(α) > σ(β)⇒ ξ(α) > ξ(β)]]; (15g)
ϑ(α) ≤ 0⇒ ∀β < α [ξ(α) Âσ(α) ξ(β) or σ(β) > σ(α) or ∃γ < β (σ(γ) ∈ [σ(β), σ(α)] )]; (15h)
ϑ(α) ≥ 0⇒ ∀β < α [ξ(α) Âσ(α) ξ(β) or σ(β) < σ(α) or ∃γ < β (σ(γ) ∈ [σ(α), σ(β)] )]; (15i)
ϑ(α) = −1⇒ ∀s < S(α)∃β < α [ϑ(β) ≤ 0 & s < σ(β) < σ(α)]; (15j)
ϑ(α) = 1⇒ ∀s > S(α)∃β < α [ϑ(β) ≥ 0 & s > σ(β) > σ(α)]. (15k)
To start with, we pick σ(0) ∈ S and ξ(0) ∈ R(σ(0)) arbitrarily, and set ϑ(0) := 0 and S(0) :=
{s ∈ S | ξ(0) ∈ R(s)}. Now (15a), (15c), (15e) and (15f) for α = 0 immediately follow from the
definitions; (15b), from Lemma 5.2.1; (15d), (15g), (15h), (15i), (15j), and (15k) hold vacuously.
Let α ∈ ∆ \ {0}, and let σ(β) ∈ S, S(β) ⊆ S, ξ(β) ∈ X, and ϑ(β) satisfying (15) have been
defined for all β < α. First of all, we define Σ(α) :=
⋃
β<α S(β). For every s ∈ Σ(α), there is a
unique, by (15d), κ(s) ∈ ∆ such that κ(s) < α and s ∈ S(κ(s)). By (15c), r := ξ ◦ κ is a selection
from R on Σ(α). The conditions (15b) and (15g) imply that r is increasing. If Σ(α) = S, then
we already have a monotone selection, so we effectively finish the process, setting S(α) := ∅, hence
S(β) = ∅ and Σ(β) = S for all β > α; there is no need to define σ(α), ξ(α), and ϑ(α) in this case.
Otherwise, we pick s∗ ∈ S \ Σ(α) arbitrarily and define ∆− := {β ∈ ∆ | β < α & σ(β) < s∗}
and ∆+ := {β ∈ ∆ | β < α & σ(β) > s∗}. Since α > 0, both ∆− and ∆+ cannot be empty; if one
of them is empty, everything related to it in the following should be just ignored. We also define
I := {s ∈ S \ Σ(α) | ∀β′ ∈ ∆− ∀β′′ ∈ ∆+ [σ(β′) < s < σ(β′′)]} [3 s∗]; (15a) and (15b) ensure that I
is an interval.
Supposing ∆− 6= ∅, we define x− := sup{ξ(β)}β∈∆− (its existence is ensured by the completeness
of X), ∆↑ := {β ∈ ∆− | ∀γ ∈ ∆− [γ ≥ β or σ(γ) < σ(β)]}, and X↑ := {ξ(β)}β∈∆↑ .
Lemma 5.3.1. ϑ(β) ≤ 0 whenever β ∈ ∆↑.
Proof. Immediately follows from condition (15k) for β and s∗.
Lemma 5.3.2. For every γ ∈ ∆−, there is β ∈ ∆↑ such that σ(β) ≥ σ(γ).
Proof. We define B := {γ′ ∈ ∆− | γ′ < γ & σ(γ′) > σ(γ)}. If B = ∅, then γ ∈ ∆↑. Otherwise,
minB ∈ ∆↑.
Lemma 5.3.3. x− = supX↑.
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemma 5.3.2 and (15g).
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Lemma 5.3.4. For every s ∈ I, there holds x− Âs ξ(β) for every β ∈ ∆↑, except β = max∆↑ if it
exists (then x− = ξ(max∆↑) ).
Proof. Let β, β′ ∈ ∆↑ and β′ > β; then σ(β′) > σ(β) by definition and ξ(β′) > ξ(β) by (15g).
Lemma 5.3.1 and (15h) for β′ imply ξ(β′) Âσ(β′) ξ(β) because the third disjunctive term in (15h) is
incompatible with β ∈ ∆↑. Therefore, ξ(β′) Âs ξ(β) by (9a). We see that condition (7a) applies to
X↑ and Âs, hence x− Âs ξ(β).
Supposing ∆+ 6= ∅, we define x+ := inf{ξ(β)}β∈∆+ , ∆↓ := {β ∈ ∆+ | ϑ(β) ≥ 0 & ∀γ ∈ ∆+ [γ ≥
β or σ(γ) > σ(β)]}, and X↓ := ξ(∆↓).
Lemma 5.3.5. ϑ(β) ≥ 0 whenever β ∈ ∆↓.
Lemma 5.3.6. For every γ ∈ ∆+, there is β ∈ ∆↓ such that σ(β) ≤ σ(γ).
Lemma 5.3.7. x+ = infX↓.
Lemma 5.3.8. For every s ∈ I, there holds x+ Âs ξ(β) for every β ∈ ∆↓, except β = max∆↓ if it
exists (then x+ = ξ(max∆↓) ).
The proofs are dual to those of Lemmas 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and 5.3.4.
Lemma 5.3.9. x− ≤ x+ (if both are defined).
Proof. Whenever β ∈ ∆+ and γ ∈ ∆−, we have ξ(β) ≥ ξ(γ) by (15g) for max{β, γ} < α. Therefore,
x− = supX↑ ≤ infX↓ = x+.
Lemma 5.3.10. Let s ∈ I and y ∈ X. If y Âs x−, then y > x−. If y Âs x+, then y < x+.
Proof. Let y < x−; by Lemma 5.3.3, there is β ∈ ∆↑ such that y < ξ(β). If y Âs x−, then, by
Lemma 5.3.4, y Âs ξ(β), hence y Âσ(β) ξ(β) by (9b), which contradicts (15a) and (15c) for β. The
case of y > x+ is treated dually.
Now we consider several alternatives.
A. Let there exist s ∈ I such that neither x−, nor x+ belong to R(s). Then we pick one of
them as σ(α), set ϑ(α) := 0, and, invoking (4), obtain ξ(α) ∈ R(σ(α)) such that ξ(α) Âσ(α) x− and
ξ(α) Âσ(α) x+. Finally, we set S(α) := {s ∈ I | ξ(α) ∈ R(s)} 3 σ(α).
B. Otherwise, we set σ(α) := s∗ and consider two alternatives again. If x− ∈ R(s∗), then
we set ϑ(α) := −1, ξ(α) := x−, and S(α) := {s ∈ I | x− ∈ R(s)} 3 σ(α). If x− /∈ R(s∗),
then x+ ∈ R(s∗) because the alternative A does not hold; we set ϑ(α) := 1, ξ(α) := x+, and
S(α) := {s ∈ I | x+ ∈ R(s)} 3 σ(α).
Let us check conditions (15). First, (15a), (15c), and (15d) immediately follow from the defini-
tions; (15b), from Lemma 5.2.1.
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If s ∈ S satisfies the conditions in the left hand side of (15e), then s /∈ I, hence there is β ∈ ∆−
such that s < σ(β); obviously, the right hand side of (15e) holds with that β. Condition (15f) is
checked dually.
Invoking Lemma 5.3.10 if the alternative A holds, we see that x− ≤ ξ(α) ≤ x+; therefore, (15g)
holds whenever ξ(β) < x− or ξ(β) > x+. Let β < α and x− ≤ ξ(β) ≤ x+. If β ∈ ∆−, we have
ξ(β) = x− and σ(β) = max{σ(γ)}γ∈∆− , hence x− /∈ R(s∗) by (15f) for β and s∗, hence ξ(α) > x−.
The case of β ∈ ∆+ is treated dually.
To check (15h), let us assume ϑ(α) ≤ 0, hence ξ(α) Âσ(α) x− or ξ(α) = x−. In the latter case, the
existence of β∗ ∈ ∆↑ such that ξ(β∗) = x− would imply a contradiction with (15f) for β∗ and σ(α)
exactly as in the previous paragraph. Therefore, ξ(α) Âσ(α) ξ(β) for every β ∈ ∆↑ by Lemma 5.3.4
and (9a). Finally, the set ∆− \∆↑ consists of β ∈ ∆− for which there exists a γ < β as in the last
disjunctive term in (15h). Condition (15i) is checked dually.
Let us check (15j). If ϑ(α) = −1, then ξ(α) = x− ∈ R(σ(α)). If s ∈ I \S(α), then x− /∈ R(s). By
(3), there is y ∈ R(s) such that y Âs x−; by Lemma 5.3.10, y > x−. If s < σ(α) then y Âσ(α) x− by
(9a), which is incompatible with x− ∈ R(σ(α)). Thus, s < S(α) is only possible if s < I. Then there
is γ ∈ ∆− such that s < σ(γ); Lemma 5.3.2 implies the existence of β ∈ ∆↑ such that σ(β) ≥ σ(γ);
Lemma 5.3.1 implies that ϑ(β) ≤ 0. Condition (15k) is checked dually.
The theorem is proven.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 3
The key role is played by the following recursive definition of a sequence xkN ∈ XN (k ∈ N) such
that xk+1N ≥ xkN and xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i) for all k ∈ N and i ∈ N . By the latter condition, xkN is a Nash
equilibrium if xk+1N = x
k
N . On the other hand, the sequence must stabilize at some stage because of
the strict acyclicity assumption.
We define x0i := minXi for each i ∈ N . Given xkN , we, for each i ∈ N independently, check
whether xki ∈ Ri(xk−i) holds. If it does, we define xk+1i := xki ; otherwise, we invoke (3) and pick
xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i) such that xk+1i Â
xk−i
i x
k
i . Supposing x
k+1
i < x
k
i (hence k > 0), we obtain x
k+1
i Â
xk−1−i
i
xki by (9b), contradicting the induction hypothesis x
k
i ∈ Ri(xk−1−i ). Therefore, xk+1i > xki , hence
xk+1N ≥ xkN .
Supposing that xk+1N > x
k
N for all k ∈ N, we denote xmax−i := (maxXj)j 6=i ∈ X−i for each i ∈ N .
Whenever xk+1i 6= xki , we have xk+1i Â
xk−i
i x
k
i and x
k+1
i > x
k
i as was shown in the previous paragraph;
since xmax−i ≥ xk−i, we have xk+1i Â
xmax−i
i x
k
i by (9a). Since N is finite, there must be i ∈ N such that
xk+1i > x
k
i for an infinite number of k. Clearly, the elimination of repetitions in the sequence 〈xki 〉k
makes it an infinite improvement path for the relation Âx
max
−i
i , which contradicts the supposed strict
acyclicity.
Remark. This proof obviously resembles Algorithm II of Topkis (1979). Note, however, that it
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collapses without the assumption that each Xi is a chain, while the original version of the algorithm,
under the “revealed preference” property (2), has no use for the assumption.
5.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Let ∆ be a well ordered set with a cardinality greater than that of XN . By transfinite recursion, we
construct a mapping ξN : ∆→ XN such that, for all β, β′, β′′ ∈ ∆, there hold:
∀i ∈ N [ξi(β + 1) ∈ Ri(ξ−i(β))]; (16a)
β′′ > β′ ⇒ ξN (β′′) ≥ ξN (β′); (16b)
β′′ > β′ ⇒ ∀i ∈ N [ξi(β′′) = ξi(β′) or ξi(β′′) Âξ−i(β
′′)
i ξi(β
′)]. (16c)
First, we define ξi(0) := minXi for each i ∈ N . Let α ∈ ∆ and ξN (β) have been defined for
all β ≤ α so that (16a) holds for all β < α while (16b) and (16c) hold for all β′, β′′ ≤ α. For each
i ∈ N , we define ξi(α + 1) := ξi(α) if ξi(α) ∈ Ri(ξ−i(α)), ensuring (16a) for β = α as well as the
continuation of (16c). Otherwise, we pick ξi(α+1) ∈ Ri(ξ−i(α)) such that ξi(α+1) Âξ−i(α)i ξi(α) (it
exists by Proposition 3 and (3)), thus ensuring (16c) for β′′ = α+ 1 and β′ = α. Checking (16b) for
β′′ = α+ 1, as well as (16c) for β′′ = α+ 1 and β′ < α, is postponed till after the definition of ξi(α)
for limits.
Let α be a limit, and ξN (β) satisfying (16) have been defined for all β < α. Then we define
ξi(α) := supβ<α ξi(β) for each i ∈ N , ensuring (16b) for β′′ = α. By (9a), (16b) and (16c), we have
ξi(β′) Âξ−i(α)i ξi(β) whenever β′, β < α and ξi(β′) > ξi(β). If ξi(α) = ξi(β) for some β < α, then
(16c) for β′′ = α is valid trivially; otherwise, the chain {ξi(β)}0≤β<α satisfies the “left-hand-side”
condition in (7a) for Âξ−i(α)i , hence ξi(α) Âξ−i(α)i ξi(β) for all β < α, i.e., (16c) for β′′ = α holds again.
Now let us return to a “successor step.” If α itself is a successor, α = α′+1, then the assumption
that ξi(α + 1) < ξi(α) would imply ξi(α + 1) Âξ−i(α
′)
i ξi(α) by (9b), contradicting (16a) for β = α
′;
therefore, (16b) continues to hold. If α is a limit, the assumption ξi(α + 1) < ξi(α) would imply
ξi(α+1) < ξi(β) for some β < α, hence ξi(α+1) < ξi(β+1), and a contradiction with the condition
ξi(β + 1) ∈ R(ξ−i(β)) is obtained in exactly the same way. In either case, (16c) for β′′ = α+ 1 and
β′ < α holds by (9a).
The final argument is standard. We must have ξN (α) = ξN (β) for some β < α. Then we have
ξN (β + 1) = ξN (β) by (16b); therefore, ξN (β) is a Nash equilibrium by (16a).
6 Concluding remarks
6.1. The analogy between our Proposition 3 and Theorem 1 of Kukushkin (2008) could be extended
by noticing that conditions (7) are also necessary for just the non-emptiness of M(Y,Â) for every
Y ∈ CX if Â is a semiorder, cf. Theorem 4.1 of Smith (1974) and Theorem 4 of Kukushkin (2008),
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but not otherwise; see Example 3 of Kukushkin (2008), where an interval order on a closed interval
in the real line admits a maximizer on every compact (i.e., subcomplete) subset, but does not satisfy
(7a).
6.2. Earlier versions of this paper contained a bit stronger variant of conditions (7):
∀Y ⊆ X [∀y, x ∈ Y [y > x⇒ y Â x]⇒ ∀x ∈ Y \ {supY } [supY Â x] ]; (17a)
∀Y ⊆ X [∀y, x ∈ Y [x > y ⇒ y Â x]⇒ ∀x ∈ Y \ {inf Y } [inf Y Â x] ]. (17b)
Under these conditions, the sufficiency in Proposition 3 can be proven in a much simpler way, in
particular, without transfinite recursion. Unfortunately, the necessity then becomes just wrong
despite the claims to the contrary in those versions.
Example 4. Let A be a well-ordered uncountable set. We define X∗ := {a ∈ A | {x ∈ A | x <
a} is countable} and X := X∗ ∪{supX∗}. It is easy to see that X is an uncountable complete chain
and maxX = supX∗ /∈ X∗. Then we partition X∗ into X0 consisting of successors, including minX,
and X∞ consisting of limits. Finally, we define a preference relation (actually, a linear order) on X:
y Â x­ [ [y ∈ X∗ & x = maxX] or [y ∈ X∞ & x ∈ X0]
or [x, y ∈ X∞ & x > y] or [x, y ∈ X0 & y > x] ].
Condition (17a) is violated for Y := X0 since supX0 = maxX. Let Y ∈ CX . If Y ∩X∞ = ∅, then Y
is finite, hence either Y = {supX∗} =M(Y,Â) or M(Y,Â) = {max(Y ∩X0)} 6= ∅. If Y ∩X∞ 6= ∅,
then M(Y,Â) = {min(Y ∩X∞)} 6= ∅.
6.3. The replacement of both conditions (9) with one of them in Proposition 6 comes at a cost. As
is easily seen from the proof, the statement of Theorem 1 can be strengthened: whenever s0 ∈ S
and x0 ∈ R(s0), there is a monotone selection r from R such that r(s0) = x0. Example 5 shows
this statement wrong without both conditions (9), even when both S and X are finite and all Âs are
orderings. However, it becomes valid again if we add (9b) to the assumptions of Proposition 6; a
routine modification of the proof is omitted.
Example 5. Let X := {0, 1}, S := {0, 1} (both with natural orders), and relations Âs be defined by
0 Â1 1; condition (9a) holds vacuously while (9b) does not. We have R(0) = {0, 1} and R(1) = {0},
so there is no monotone selection with r(0) = 1.
6.4. If both minS and maxS exist in Theorem 1, then ϑk in the recursive construction becomes
superfluous. Moreover, there exists a monotone selection r from R with a finite range r(S): Lem-
mas 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 imply the impossibility of an infinite monotone subsequence of 〈sk〉k, hence the
sequence must be finite.
6.5. It remains unclear whether the assumption that both X and S are chains can be dropped or
weakened in Theorem 1. From the game-theoretic viewpoint, however, the question does not seem
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pressing. The existence of an ε-Nash equilibrium in a game with increasing best responses may
hold in the absence of monotone selections as Theorem 3 and Example 1 demonstrate. If the best
responses are, say, decreasing, then, indeed, all existence results in the literature need monotone
selections, but they also need the strategies effectively be scalar and each player be only affected by
a scalar aggregate of the partners/rivals’ choices.
6.6. For games with strategic substitutes and preferences “less rational” than assumed in Theorems 1
and 2, e.g., where each player may keep in mind several objectives, there is neither equilibrium
existence result, nor an example of nonexistence (in the presence of an appropriate aggregation as,
say, in Proposition 5). On the other hand, the remark after Example 1 is relevant here too.
6.7. The assumption in Theorems 3 and 4 that each Xi is a chain is strong enough to be extremely
irritating; however, I have no idea at the moment whether and how it could be dispensed with.
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